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NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action commenced by the plaintiff for breach 
of an Employment Agreement. Plaintiff alleged that defendant had 
no "casue" to terminate him from his employment under the 
Employment Agreement, and accordingly he was entitled to one-
third (1/3) of his yearly salary as liquidated damages, pursuant 
to the provisions of the Employment Agreement, Defendant 
answered by asserting that plaintiff's termination was for 
"cause" due to actions by the plaintiff which were unethical 
and/or were acts of moral turpitude. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT AND ON APPEAL 
The Lower Court, in a bench trial, ruled in favor of 
the plaintiff. The case was heard by the Honorable David B. Dee, 
Judge of the Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County, 
Utah. After oral argument before the above-entitled Court on 
February 9, 1988, and pursuant to Rule 30(d) of the Rules of the 
Utah Supreme Court, the above-entitled Court reversed the 
Judgment of the Lower Court and remanded the case for entry of 
Judgment in favor of the defendant. 
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STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED IN PETITION FOR REHEARING 
1. Did the Lower Court use the correct standard of 
review in determining that the defendant had no factual or legal 
bases to determine that plaintiff's conduct was unethical or an 
act of moral turpitude? 
2. If the Lower Court did not use the correct 
standard of review, did it nonetheless make Findings of Fact 
sufficient to support an affirmation of the Lower Court's 
Judgment on proper grounds even though different from those 
relied upon by the Lower Court? 
3. If the Lower Court's Findings of Fact were not 
sufficient to support a Judgment upon the correct standard of 
review, then should the matter be reversed and remanded for 
additional Findings of Fact or a new trial, rather than reversed 
and Judgment entered for defendant? 
ARGUMENT 
I* Reasoning behind Utah Supreme Court's Decision to Reverse 
the Lower Court Judgment and Remand for Entry of Judgment in 
Favor of Defendant. 
Because the Utah Supreme Court elected to hear the 
Appeal in this matter pursuant to Rule 30(d) of the Rules of the 
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Utah Supreme Court, and subsequently the parties received notice 
of the above-entitled Court1s decision a few days after oral 
argument without an explanation of the bases of the decision, 
plaintiff can only assume that, in light of the questions of the 
Justices at oral argument on February 9, 1988, this Court decided 
to reverse the Lower Court's Judgment because it felt that the 
Lower Court had used an inappropriate standard of review of the 
employment contract language, and therefore the Lower Court's 
Judgment was error as a matter of law. 
It is plaintiff's position that the Lower Court used 
the correct standard of review in ruling in favor of the 
plaintiff in the Lower Court proceeding. However, even if the 
Lower Court used the wrong standard of review, the Findings of 
Fact entered by the Lower Court support Judgment for the 
plaintiff under what the plaintiff assumes is this Court's 
determination of the correct standard of review, or at the very 
least, this Court should reverse and remand for a new trial to be 
held whereby the Lower Court will be directed to utilize the 
correct standard of review. 
II. The Lower Court Used the Correct Standard of Review in 
Determining Whether Defendants Board of Directors had Cause 
With Which to Terminate Plaintiff's Employment. 
Plaintiff assumes that this Court determined that, 
given the language in paragraph 1(f) of the Employment Agreement 
between defendant and plaintiff, the Board of Directors of 
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defendant had total discretion by which to determine whether the 
conduct of the plaintiff was unethical or involved an act of 
moral turpitude. Accordingly, this Court determined that the 
Lower Court should have determined whether the Board of 
Directors1 discretionary judgment was made arbitrarily and 
capriciously, or in bad faith and therefore contrary to the 
implied duty of good faith and fair dealing in all contracts. 
Even if the Lower Court had followed this standard of 
review it would have had to find the facts as it did in the Lower 
Court proceeding. In order to determine if the judgment of the 
Board of Directors was arbitrary and capricious, the Lower Court 
would have to analyze the bases of the Board of Directors' 
allegations of unethical conduct or acts of moral turpitude by 
the plaintiff. The Lower Court did this, and made specific 
findings thereon. Similarly, in order to determine whether the 
Board acted in good faith in coming to its decision with regard 
to plaintiff's conduct, the Lower Court would have to determine 
whether there were any bases to the allegations made by the Board 
of Directors as to plaintiff's actions. If the Lower Court is 
not entitled, under the standard of review as determined by this 
Court, to review the factual underpinnings of the Board of 
Directors' judgment, it has no way to determine the good faith or 
capriciousness of that judgment short of hearing self-serving 
testimony from the various directors of defendant regarding to 
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their intentions and mental processes in coming to their decision 
regarding plaintiff's conduct. 
The case law extant in Utah and surrounding 
jurisdictions that has dealt with interpretations of employment 
contracts similar to that at issue here is limited. Most of the 
decisions concern employees of corporations or other business 
entities where the contractual provisions do not discuss an 
employer's discretion in determining whether its employees' 
actions or omissions rise to the level of the contractually-
defined "cause." Nonetheless, the cases that exist support a 
standard of review by the Trial Court similar to that used by the 
Lower Court in this action, that is, making findings of fact with 
regard to the employees' actions or omissions rather than 
reveiwing whether the employer's decision was arbitrary or made 
in bad faith. See, Chiodo v. General Water Works Corporation, 17 
Ut.2d 425, 413 P.2d 891 (1966); Rosecrans v. Intermountain Soap 
and Chemical Company, Inc., 100 Idaho 785, 605 P.2d 963 (1980); 
Thermo-Kinetic Corporation v. Allen, 16 Ariz. App. 341, 493 P.2d 
508 (1972). 
In Davis v. Tucson Arizona Boys Choir Society, 137 
Ariz. 228, 669 P.2d 1005 (1983), plaintiff was the director of 
the defendant. Defendant was a non-profit corporation, just as 
the defendant in the instant case is. The contractual language, 
as quoted in the opinion of the Arizona Court of Appeals, is 
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similar to that in the employment contract between the plaintiff 
and defendant herein: 
8. TERMINATION OF CONTRACT: the Society 
shall have the right by and through the 
action of the Board of Directors to remove 
the Director for neglect of duties or 
inappropriate behavior. 
9. WRONGFUL DISCHARGE: in the event the 
Society shall wrongfully discharge the 
Director for any reason, then and in that 
event, the Society shall pay to the Director 
all compensation which would have been earned 
by the Director from the time of wrongful 
discharge until the last day of the following 
June. 
In the Tucson Arizona Boys Choir Society case, as in 
the instant case, the Board of Directors of the defendant non-
profit corporation had the discretionary right to determine 
whether the director had been neglecting his duties or had 
engaged in inappropriate behavior. The Trial Court utilized the 
standard of review supported by plaintiff herein, analyzing the 
bases of the "cause" by which the defendant Tucson Arizona Boys 
Choir Society terminated their director. The Trial Court found 
in favor of the plaintiff and awarded liquidated damages to him 
as called for under the employment contract. On appeal the 
defendant argued, similar to the questioning of this Court at 
oral argument in the instant case, that the Lower Court was 
limited to reviewing the good faith of the defendant's actions, 
rather than whether there was a factual basis for justifying 
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termination for "cause." The Arizona Court of Appeals responded 
to that argument as follows: 
The contract provided that the appellee could 
be discharged for neglect of duty or 
inappropriate behavior. There was evidence 
of discipline problems, some poor musical 
performances, poor business judgment, etc. 
However, as could be expected, there was a 
conflict in this evidence. Whether the Board 
had cause is a question of fact, and the 
Trial Court implicitly found it did not. The 
appellant contends that as long as it acts in 
good faith it does not matter whether the 
appellee had neglected his duties or had been 
guilty of inappropriate behavior. The 
appellant is wrong. 
Davis v. Tucson Arizona Boys Choir Society, 669 P.2d at 1009-10. 
In short, the Lower Court in the instant case utilized 
the correct standard of review during the trial, notwithstanding 
the language in the Employment Agreement that whether plaintiff 
engaged in unethical acts or acts of moral turpitude was in the 
judgment and determination of the Board of Directors of 
defendant, the Lower Court's decision should be affirmed. 
III. Even if the Lower Court Utilized the Wrong Standard of 
Review in Determining Plaintiff's Breach of Contract Action 
in the Lower Court, the Findings of Fact Entered by the 
Lower Court Were Sufficient to Support an Affirmation of the 
Judgment Under the Correct Standard of Review. 
It is well-settled in Utah that the Utah Supreme Court 
can affirm a Trial Court's decision on proper grounds even though 
different than those relied upon by the Trial Court. Branch v. 
Western Petroleum, Inc., 657 P.2d 267, 276 (Utah 1982); Goodsel 
v. Dept. of Business Regulation, 523 P.2d 1230, 1232 (Utah 1974). 
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This rule was most recently affirmed by the Utah Court of Appeals 
in Kinsman v. Kinsman, 73 Utah Adv. Rep. 110 (1988). Even if the 
proper grounds are not argued by the parties, this Court can 
decide the case on the proper grounds. Action v. Deliran, 737 
P.2d 996, 999 n.4 (Utah 1987). 
As noted above, even if the correct standard of review 
for the Lower Court was to determine whether the Board of 
Directors of defendant acted arbitrarily and capaciously or in 
bad faith in determining that plaintiff engaged in unethical 
conduct or acts of moral turpitude, the only way the Lower Court 
could engage in such a review was by analyzing the underlying 
factual allegations utilized by the Board of Directors in coming 
to its determination. The Lower Court did that, and entered 
specific Findings of Fact to that end. Accordingly, the Lower 
Court's decision that plaintiff was terminated without cause was 
correct, albeit possibly according to the wrong standard of 
review. This Court can affirm the Lower Court's Judgment under 
the correct standard of review. 
IV. If the Lower Courtis Findings of Fact Are Not Sufficient to 
Support Its Judgment Under the Correct Standard of Review. 
This Matter Should be Reversed and Remanded for a New Trial. 
If it is the determination of the above-entitled Court 
that the Lower Court used the in correct standard of review in 
coming to its judgment, and that the Lower Court's Findings of 
Fact are not sufficient to support its Judgment even under the 
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appropriate standard of review, the correct decision on appeal is 
to reverse and remand for a new trial. Gilbert v. City of 
Caldwell, 112 Idaho 386, 732 P.2d 355, 364-65 (Idaho App. 1987); 
Umrein v. Nelson, 70 Or. App. 104, 688 P.2d 419, 422 (1984). 
This Court cannot overturn a Lower Court decision and 
compel Findings of Fact in favor of the defendant unless the 
evidence in the record is such that all reasonable minds must 
come to that finding. Great Salt Lake Minerals & Chemical 
Corporation v. Arthur G. McKee & Company, 539 P.2d 371, 373 (Utah 
1975); Howarth v. Osterqaard, 30 Ut.2d 183, 515 P.2d 442, 444 
(1973). In the instant case, where the judge who presided over 
the Lower Court proceeding has retired, this Court should reverse 
and remand for a new trial rather than for additional findings of 
fact. Acton v. Deliran. 737 P.2d 996, 999 (Utah 1987). Benton 
v. Albuquerque National Bank, 103 N.M. 5, 701 P.2d 1025, 1033 
(N.M. App 1985). 
CONCLUSION 
According to the case law of Utah and surrounding 
jurisdictions, and in the context of the review of an employment 
contract provision calling for termination for cause, the Lower 
Court used the correct standard of review in finding for the 
plaintiff in this matter. Even if this Court determines that, as 
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a matter of law, the Lower Court used the incorrect standard of 
review, this specific Findings of Fact entered by the Lower Court 
support the correct standard of review as determined by this 
Court. 
If it is the determination of this Court that the Lower 
Court's Findings of Fact do not support the correct standard of 
review, than this matter should not be reversed and remanded to 
the Lower Court for entry of Judgment in favor of defendant, but 
rather reversed and remanded for a new trial based upon the 
proper standard of review. 
Dated this 26th day of February, 1988. 
TIBBALS, HOWELL, JONES & MOXLEY 
Plaintiff-Respondent 
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CERTIFICATION OF GOOD FAITH 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
:ss 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
I, JEFFREY R. ORITT, being duly sworn, hereby depose 
and say that: 
1. I am the attorney for the plaintiff-respondent in 
the above-entitled appeal. 
2. I have prepared and, on this date, submitted to 
the above-entitled Court plaintiff-respondent's Petition for 
Rehearing pursuant to Rule 35 of the Rules of the Utah Supreme 
Court. 
3. Pursuant to Rule 35(a) of the Rules of the Utah 
Supreme Court, I hereby certify that this Petition is presented 
in good faith and not for delay. There are significant points of 
law and fact, as set forth in this Petition, which plaintiff-
respondent feels the above-entitled Court has overlooked or 
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misconstrued. Accordingly, plaintiff-respondent's Petition for 
Rehearing is hereby submitted. 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to 
February, 1988. 
his 26th day of 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
Residing at: 
My Commission Expires: 
_L_LL 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the 26th day of February, 1988 
I caused four true and correct copies of the foregoing Petition 
for Rehearing of Respondent to be delivered by placing the same 
in the United States mail, postage prepaid, to the following: 
BIELE, HASLAM & HATCH 
Roy G. Haslam 
Thomas R. Grisley 
Attorneys for Defendant-Appellant 
50 West Broadway, 4th Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
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